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THE UNITED STATES, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, AND THE SITUATION IN
AFGHANISTAN
Sara L. Ochs*
INTRODUCTION
The United States has always had a very complicated and tense relationship
with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and with international criminal law
generally.1 Yet, under the Trump administration, the U.S.–ICC relationship has
deteriorated to an unprecedented level. Within the last few years, the U.S.
government has launched a full-scale attack on the ICC—denouncing its legitimacy,
authority, and achievements, blocking investigations, and loudly withdrawing all
once-existing support for the court.
These hostilities bubbled over following the November 2017 request by the
ICC Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, for the court to open an investigation into
alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan since
2003, including those perpetrated by the U.S. military. 2 The U.S. government has
always viewed the ICC as an entity designed to infringe on state sovereignty, and
Prosecutor Bensouda’s request immediately invited harsh retaliation from the
Trump administration. The United States, largely through and at the direction of
President Trump’s former National Security Advisor, John Bolton, took significant
© 2019 Sara L. Ochs. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute
copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy
identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes
provision and copyright notice.
* Sara L. Ochs is a fellow at Elon University School of Law, where she teaches International
Criminal Law and Legal Method & Communication. She earned her J.D. from Loyola University
New Orleans College of Law and her B.B.A. from Loyola University Maryland.
1 See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & Mark A. Drumbl, The United States and the
International Criminal Court: A Complicated, Uneasy, Yet at Times Engaging Relationship 2–8
(Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-07-02, 2016),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1504&context=wlufac
(tracing the history of U.S. involvement in and relationship with the ICC under the Clinton, Bush,
and Obama administrations).
2 See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Fatou Bensouda, Requests Judicial Authorisation to Commence an Investigation into the
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=171120-otp-stat-afgh [hereinafter Press Release on Bensouda’s
Request for Investigation].
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efforts to block all preliminary investigations into the Afghanistan situation, going
so far as to revoke Prosecutor Bensouda’s visa to enter the United States and
threatening economic sanctions if the ICC continued its investigation. 3
Following the U.S. government’s prolonged and very public attack, an ICC
Pre-Trial Chamber rejected Prosecutor Bensouda’s request, citing the volatility
surrounding the proposed investigation and the minimal cooperation the Office of
the Prosecutor had encountered to date.4 The court’s language leaves little doubt
that the U.S. attack on the ICC and its personnel served as the crux of its decision.
The United States’s hostilities come at a time when the ICC is subject to severe
global scrutiny. Widespread allegations that the court is unfairly targeting African
states and seeking to undermine the sovereignty of its state members has created a
“legitimacy crisis” in the court, prompting the withdrawal of several African and
Asian states from the Rome Statute.5 In efforts to counter the global perception that
the ICC cares only about African crimes, in 2016, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) reiterated a policy of investigating a broad array of crimes committed in
geographically diverse locations.6 In line with this policy, the OTP has begun
pursuing preliminary examinations into crimes committed in non-African states,
several of which implicate Western powers, including permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council.7 While these investigations have elicited further backlash
against the ICC—primarily by Western states—none has sparked as antagonistic and
detrimental a response as the proposed investigation into Afghanistan.
The ICC’s apparent bending of will to the hostile attacks from the United States
presents legitimate concern regarding the future direction of the court, as well as that
of international criminal law more broadly. Likewise, in many ways, the ICC’s
decision significantly undermines U.S. foreign policy initiatives and prerogatives.
3 Judith Kelley, The U.S. Revoked the Visa for the ICC Prosecutor. That Bodes Poorly for
International
Criminal
Justice.,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
8,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/08/us-revoked-visa-icc-prosecutor-that-bodespoorly-international-criminal-justice/?utm_term=.c04ad3fd666c.
4 See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17, Decision Pursuant
to Art. 15 of the Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic
Republic
of
Afghanistan,
¶
94
(Apr.
12,
2019),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF [hereafter Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation].
5 To date, Burundi, the Philippines, and Malaysia have withdrawn from the Rome Statute.
Malaysia Backtracks on Accession to the Rome Statute, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 12,
2019), http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20190412/malaysia-backtracks-accession-romestatute; Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar.
15, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/qa-international-criminal-court-and-unitedstates.
6 See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM. CT., POLICY PAPER ON CASE
SELECTION
AND
PRIORITISATION
¶
7,
at
4–5
(2016),
https://www.icccpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf.
7 See Carsten Stahn, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Challenges and Critiques
of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 413, 415–16 (2017) (discussing
the ICC’s opening of preliminary examinations into unlawful killings committed by British troops
in Iraq, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed within the Israel-Palestine conflict, and
crimes—including those allegedly committed by Russia—in the conflicts within Ukraine and
Crimea).
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This Essay will examine the complicated history of the U.S.–ICC relationship, as
well as the background of and reasons for the court’s decision denying Prosecutor
Bensouda’s request for an investigation into Afghanistan. The Essay will conclude
by examining the significant and detrimental impact this decision may ultimately
have on both the ICC and U.S. foreign policy.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ICC

The United States bears a convoluted history with the ICC. While the United
States played a significant role in the Rome Conference, it quickly became one of
the most outspoken opponents of the ICC and ultimately voted against the adoption
of the Rome Statute.8 Notably, the U.S. delegation in Rome identified three primary
concerns with the statute: (1) it provided the court with the ability to exercise
jurisdiction over non-States Parties; (2) it enabled the Prosecutor to initiate
investigations and prosecutions on his or her own authority; and (3) it did not require
Security Council authorization before bringing a case of aggression before the
court.9
Despite these concerns, a growing domestic opposition to ICC jurisdiction, and
a conflicted presidential cabinet, on December 31, 2000, shortly before the
conclusion of his term and on the last day the Rome Statute was open for signature,
then President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute.1 0 Yet, in his signing statement,
President Clinton recognized the court’s “significant flaws,” notably the first
objection raised by the U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference. 1 1 He further
announced his recommendation that President George W. Bush, as his successor,
not immediately submit the Rome Statute to the Senate for ratification.1 2
Under the subsequent Bush administration, tensions between the United States
and the ICC heightened significantly. In August 2002, Congress enacted the
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which aimed to shield members of the
U.S. armed forces from international prosecution by the ICC and even authorized
the U.S. President to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to obtain the release
of American soldiers from ICC detention.1 3 The United States also negotiated—
largely through political intimidation—approximately one hundred bilateral
8 See Stephen Eliot Smith, Definitely Maybe: The Outlook for U.S. Relations with the
International Criminal Court During the Obama Administration, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 155, 160
(2010).
9 Sadat & Drumbl, supra note 1, at 4. In total, the delegation recognized six objections to
the Rome Statute, the remaining being (1) that the statute did not include a ten-year opt-out period
for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a resolution appended to the statute proposing that drug crimes and
terrorism be included within the court’s jurisdiction; and (3) that the statute did not allow for states
to make any reservations prior to signing. Id. at 4, n.14.
10 See John P. Cerone, Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes Toward
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 277, 293 (2007).
11 Press Release, White House, Statement by the President: Signature of the International
Criminal
Court
Treaty
(Dec.
31,
2000),
http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/library/hot_releases/December_31_2000.html.
12 Smith, supra note 8, at 161.
13 See id. at 162 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7427(a) (2012)).
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“nonsurrender” agreements, under which States Parties agreed not to surrender any
American citizen sought by the ICC who entered their state territory.1 4 Finally, and
most importantly, in a letter sent by John Bolton, then U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations and later the National Security Advisor under President Trump, the
Bush administration notified the United Nations that it had “unsigned” the Rome
Statute,1 5 which Bolton has famously cited as “his happiest moment.” 1 6
The United States’s animosity towards the ICC melted slightly under the
Obama administration, which sought to “end hostility towards the ICC and look for
opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that promote U.S. interests
by bringing war criminals to justice.”1 7 President Obama even voted for the U.N.
Security Council resolution that referred to the ICC the situation in Libya involving
the brutal violence against protestors of the Muammar Gadaffi regime, and
remarkably lobbied other Council States to do the same. 1 8 Yet, despite these
improvements in the United States’s relationship with the ICC, the Obama
administration still refused to submit the Rome Statute, which it viewed as “flawed,”
to the U.S. Senate for a vote on ratification. 1 9 As one commentator recognized,
while the Obama administration discontinued the expression of open hostilities
towards the court, it did not “abandon the conservative policies that distance and
protect America from the ICC.”2 0
The U.S. government’s hesitation toward and apparent distrust of the ICC
essentially boils down to one primary concern: the possibility that U.S. citizens may
be prosecuted and convicted by the court for conduct ordered or supported by the
U.S. government.2 1 And this concern is not unfounded. The United States has an
14 See Cerone, supra note 10, at 296; see also Eric M. Meyer, International Law: The
Compatibility of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court with the U.S. Bilateral
Immunity Agreements Included in the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 58 OKLA. L.
REV. 97, 99 (2005) (recognizing that the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act contained a
provision prohibiting the U.S. from providing military assistance to any ICC State Party unless the
State Party has signed a bilateral nonsurrender agreement or is subject to a relevant exception).
15 See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., to
Kofi
Annan,
U.N.
Sec’y
Gen.
(May
6,
2002),
https://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
16 John B. Bellinger III, International Law and the Foreign Affairs Challenges for the Next
Administration, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 909, 913 (2017).
17 Jean Galbraith, Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the International
Criminal Court, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 169, 169 (2019) (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, International
Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 525, 534 (2013) (quoting Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton)).
18 Megan A. Fairlie, The United States and the International Criminal Court Post Bush: A
Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely Marriage, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 528, 529 (2011) (noting
further that the Obama administration sent representatives to the ICC’s annual meeting of the
Assembly of States Parties in 2009 and sent a number of Americans to attend and observe the ICC
Review Conference in Uganda in mid-2010).
19 See Bellinger, supra note 16, at 913–14.
20 See Brett D. Schaefer, Beating the ICC, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 18, 2013),
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/beating-the-icc.
21 See Steven Veenema, Willful Ignorance—Contextualizing U.S. Policy Toward the
International Criminal Court, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 167, 181–83 (2006) (noting as
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unfortunate history of engaging in internationally prohibited conduct in times of
armed conflict, including its widespread use of chemical weapons in Vietnam and
the abuse and torture of prisoners of war at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. 2 2
Thus, when the ICC began intimating its intent to investigate U.S. involvement
in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan, the
Trump administration found serious cause for concern and ultimately reignited the
American fight against the ICC. Unfortunately, this fight has proven detrimental to
both sides.
II.

THE REQUEST TO OPEN AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE AFGHANISTAN
SITUATION

Afghanistan has experienced several civil wars and decades of internal unrest
since the 1970s, culminating in the U.S. invasion and subsequent international
conflict following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.2 3 In 2006, the ICC OTP
initially opened a preliminary examination into alleged crimes committed in
Afghanistan2 4 Little documented progress was made within the preliminary
examination until November 2017, when Prosecutor Bensouda sought to proceed
with an investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in Afghanistan since May 1, 2003, as well as closely linked crimes
committed in other States Parties’ territories since July 1, 2002.2 5 Because
Prosecutor Bensouda intended to initiate the investigation proprio motu, or on her
own authority, she requested judicial approval from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber to
open the investigation, as required by Article 15 of the Rome Statute.2 6 The request
specifically proposed investigation into three categories of crimes: (1) crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed by the Taliban and related armed groups (i.e.,
the Haqqani Network); (2) war crimes committed by the Afghan National Security
Forces; and (3) war crimes committed by members of the U.S. armed forces in
Afghanistan, as well as by the CIA in secret detention facilities within Afghanistan
and on the territory of other States Parties.2 7

well that the U.S. fear that an ICC Prosecutor could question U.S. judicial action and determine
“that any U.S. prosecution or investigation constituted a failure to genuinely prosecute”).
22 See generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005) (detailing
and questioning the international legality of the prisoner abuses at Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib).
23 See
Afghanistan,
COALITION
FOR
INT’L
CRIM.
CT.,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/afghanistan (last visited Aug. 9, 2019).
24 See Press Release on Bensouda’s Request for Investigation, supra note 2.
25 Id.
26 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 15, ¶¶ 1, 3, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (requiring that the
Prosecutor “submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation,
together with any supporting material collected,” and permitting the opening of the investigation
only upon the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization of same, “without prejudice to subsequent
determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of the case”) .
27 Press Release on Bensouda’s Request for Investigation, supra note 2.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

94

[VOL. 95:2

Prosecutor Bensouda’s request embodied two of the primary objections the
United States has consistently maintained against the ICC since the Rome
Conference: the power of the court to exercise jurisdiction over nonstates parties
(including the United States), and the power of the prosecutor to initiate
investigations on her own authority.2 8 In response to Prosecutor Bensouda’s
request, on September 10, 2018, John Bolton delivered an address attacking the ICC
and its decision to continue investigations into the U.S. military’s role in
Afghanistan.2 9 Bolton labeled the court as a threat to American sovereignty and
national security interests and promised that the United States would take “any
means necessary” to protect its citizens and citizens of allied nations “from unjust
prosecution by this illegitimate court.”3 0 He also vowed not to provide the ICC with
any further American cooperation or assistance, deciding instead to “let the ICC die
on its own.”3 1 While Bolton’s attack was met largely with international
condemnation,3 2 it still posed a sizable threat to the court’s legitimacy.
The ICC succinctly addressed Bolton’s virulent speech by recognizing that it
would be “undeterred” in its mission to bring justice to communities affected by
perpetrators of international crimes.3 3 Yet, in March 2019, Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo announced that the United States would revoke or deny visas to ICC
personnel coming to the United States for purposes related to the investigation into
the situation in Afghanistan.3 4 In April 2019, the United States revoked the entry
visa for Prosecutor Bensouda and, through Pompeo, threatened to take additional
steps, including economic sanctions, if the ICC continued its investigation. 3 5
On April 12, 2019, these escalating pressures culminated in a unanimous
decision by the three judges on ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC) rejecting Prosecutor
Bensouda’s request to proceed with the investigation.3 6 In its decision, the PTC first
recognized that the intent of Article 15 of the Rome Statute in requiring judicial

28
29
30

Veenema, supra note 21, at 181.
Galbraith, supra note 17, at 169.
Matthew Lee, Bolton: International Criminal Court ‘Already Dead to Us’, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Sept. 11, 2018); https://www.apnews.com/4831767ed5db484ead574a402a5e7a85.
31 Galbraith, supra note 17, at 170.
32 See Alex Moorehead & Alex Whiting, Countries’ Reactions to Bolton’s Attack on the ICC,
JUST SECURITY (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60773/countries-reactions-boltonsattack-icc/; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law: A
Reply, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 16, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/16/the-trump-administrationand-international-law-a-reply/ (noting that the only states to offer support to Bolton’s speech were
those with officials under investigation by the ICC, including Sudan and Burundi).
33 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The ICC Will Continue Its Independent and Impartial
Work, Undeterred, ICC-CPI-20180912-PR1406 (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1406.
34 Marlise Simons & Megan Specia, U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C. Prosecutor Pursuing Afghan
War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/world/europe/usicc-prosecutor-afghanistan.html (referencing Pompeo’s comments made in a March 2019 press
briefing directed to ICC investigators and personnel stating they “should not assume that you will
still have or will get a visa, or that you will be permitted to enter the United States”).
35 Kelley, supra note 3.
36 See generally Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation, supra note 4.
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authorization for a propio motu investigation is partly to prevent “[f]rivolous,
ungrounded or otherwise predictably inconclusive investigations [that] would
unnecessarily infringe on fundamental individual rights without serving either the
interests of justice or any of the universal values underlying the Statute.”3 7 It then
cited the standard imposed by Article 15, requiring that the Prosecutor present a
“reasonable basis to proceed with [the] investigation.”3 8 In determining whether the
Prosecutor has done so, the PTC recognized that it must consider: (1) whether the
crime falls within the jurisdiction of the court; (2) whether the case is admissible
(with regard to the requisite gravity of the alleged crimes and the Rome Statute’s
complementarity requirement); and (3) whether there are “nonetheless substantial
reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” 3 9
The PTC then determined that in considering the third factor, requiring that the
investigation be “in the interests of justice,” it needed to weigh the gravity of the
alleged crimes, the victims’ interests, and the potential feasibility of the
investigation.4 0
After positively finding that Prosecutor Bensouda’s proposed investigation
met the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements of the Rome Statute,4 1 the PTC
then ultimately determined that the investigation, which had already been met by
“severe constraints and challenges,”4 2 would not serve the “interests of justice.”4 3
In so doing, the PTC noted the minimal cooperation the OTP had experienced from
authorities in investigating the crimes, the “complexity and volatility of the political
climate still surrounding the Afghan scenario,” and the significant time that has
elapsed since the alleged commission of the crimes.4 4 Despite recognizing that 680
out of 699 applications submitted to the court by victims and victims groups
welcomed the requested investigation,4 5 the PTC concluded that the aforementioned
circumstances made prospects of a successful investigation unlikely and that the
investigation thus ran afoul of the interests of justice. 4 6

37 Id. ¶ 34.
38 Id. ¶ 29.
39 Id. ¶ 87. The PTC noted these factors are set forth in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, which
governs the standard appropriate for a Prosecutor to determine whether there is a “reasonable basis
to proceed with an investigation.” See id. ¶ 29; see also Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 53(1).
40 Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation, supra note 4, ¶ 35.
41 See id. ¶¶ 48, 66 (finding that the alleged crimes fell within the Rome Statute); ¶¶ 79, 86
(finding the admissibility requirement satisfied both with regard to complementarity and the gravity
of the alleged crimes).
42 Id. ¶ 44.
43 Id. ¶ 87.
44 Id. ¶¶ 93–94.
45 Id. ¶ 87. Article 15 of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that victims may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber either in support or opposition to the Prosecutor’s request
for an investigation. Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 15(3).
46 Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation, supra note 4, ¶ 96.
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THE IMPACT OF THE PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER’S DECISION

Prosecutor Bensouda’s request to open an investigation into the situation in
Afghanistan embodied the primary concerns voiced by the United States since the
negotiations of the Rome Statute. It presented a concrete possibility of investigation
and prosecution of not only U.S. citizens, but of high-ranking military and state
officials. Viewed through this lens, the Trump administration’s backlash to
Prosecutor Bensouda’s request is far from surprising. Yet, the ICC’s response to
U.S. hostilities in denying the investigation request has potentially drastic
implications both for the court’s legitimacy and for U.S. foreign policy.
The PTC’s decision does little to assuage criticism of the court’s exclusive
focus on prosecuting African crimes. In fact, by rewarding the United States for its
failure to cooperate, the PTC sends the message that Western powers are immune
from international prosecution for war crimes, especially when they act to pose
obstacles to OTP investigations. The PTC’s decision is a clear example of the ICC
succumbing to American pressures and sweeping heinous crimes under the rug in
an effort to ensure goodwill with members of the U.N. Security Council.
Specifically, this sets dangerous precedent undermining the OTP’s recent efforts to
expand its geographic reach. This is especially concerning given the open
preliminary examination into alleged war crimes committed by UK nationals in the
context of the Iraq conflict between 2003 and 2008. 4 7 Like the Afghanistan
situation, any investigation opened within the Iraq–UK situation would most likely
be through Prosecutor Bensouda’s propio motu authority.4 8 The PTC’s decision
logically encourages UK officials to refuse cooperation to the greatest extent
possible in an effort to render infeasible any potential investigation into British war
crimes.
While the PTC’s decision has been met largely with outrage, 4 9 one group of
scholars has applauded the PTC’s decision on the ground that it marks a policy shift
towards devoting the court’s minimal resources only to those investigations that

47 See Preliminary Examination: Iraq/UK, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/iraq
(last visited Aug. 10, 2019).
48 See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Fatou Bensouda, Re-Opens the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Iraq (May 13, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014 (noting that while
the preliminary examination was concluded in 2006, Prosecutor Bensouda reopened the
preliminary examination in May 2014, following receipt of new information supporting allegations
that British officials were involved in “systematic detainee abuse in Iraq from 2003 until 2008”).
49 See, e.g., Afghanistan: ICC Refuses to Authorize Investigation, Caving into USA Threats,
AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/afghanistanicc-refuses-to-authorize-investigation-caving-into-usa-threats/ (opining that the decision “marks a
shocking abandonment of victims and will further weaken the court’s credibility”); Christian De
Vos, No ICC Investigation in Afghanistan: A Bad Decision with Big Implications, INT’L JUSTICE
MONITOR (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/04/no-icc-investigation-inafghanistan-a-bad-decision-with-big-implications/ (noting that the decision “surprised and angered
many”).
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yield a strong likelihood of success.5 0 This view further promotes an ICC focused
only on crimes that do not implicate states with close ties to the United Nations,
further alienating the developing Asian and African states who already feel
victimized by the court. Moreover, there is no evidence that this decision marks any
new policy towards focusing exclusively on investigations and prosecutions in
which the states or parties involved are highly cooperative. Indeed, the court
continues to pursue a case pertaining to crimes committed in the government of the
Philippines’ “war on drugs” campaign, even though the Philippines objected so
strongly to the ICC’s opening of a preliminary examination that it withdrew from
the Rome Statute.5 1 Thus, marking the PTC decision as representative of a policy
shift in favor of efficiency is unrealistically optimistic.
Further, while the Trump administration has labeled the PTC’s decision a
“major international victory,”5 2 the United States’s apparent disdain for the ICC
significantly compromises the nation’s status as a proponent of global justice. The
Trump administration’s conduct in rebuking the authority and the legitimacy of the
only permanent court established to prosecute crimes committed at an international
level undermines U.S. policy in bringing perpetrators of worldwide atrocities to
justice.5 3 By calling for the death of the ICC, the Trump administration has
concretized the United States’s reputation as an international bully and has sought
to eradicate an institution that oftentimes provides the sole means for bringing brutal
dictators and atrocity perpetrators to justice.
The Trump administration’s actions also undermine U.S. foreign policy
initiatives. By taking a very public, very loud offensive to the ICC’s Afghanistan
decision, the United States has welcomed impunity for atrocities committed by the
Taliban and affiliated groups deemed as terrorist organizations by the U.S.
Department of State.5 4 The United States’s constant pressure on the ICC resulted
in the PTC’s decision to block Prosecutor Bensouda’s requested investigation in its

50 See Alex Whiting, The ICC’s Afghanistan Decision: Bending to U.S. or Focusing Court
on
Successful
Investigations?,
JUST
SECURITY
(Apr.
12,
2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/63613/the-iccs-afghanistan-decision-bending-to-u-s-or-focusingcourt-on-successful-investigations/ (recognizing the PTC’s decision as “the beginning of a broader
effort by the judges and the Prosecutor to orient the Court’s very limited resources toward those
investigations where there exists some meaningful prospect of success”).
51 The Philippines: Preliminary Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT. (last visited Oct. 5, 2019),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/philippines (noting that despite the Philippines’ withdrawal, the ICC
“retains its jurisdiction over crimes committed during the time in which the State was party to the
Statute and may exercise this jurisdiction even after the withdrawal became effective”).
52 Press Release, White House, Statement from the President (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-from-the-president-8/.
53 See David Scheffer, Ambass. David Scheffer on John Bolton’s Announcement of “Ugly
and Dangerous” Punitive Actions Against Judges, Prosecutors of Int’l Criminal Court, JUST
SECURITY (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60678/ambass-david-scheffer-johnboltons-announcement-ugly-dangerous-punitive-actions-judges-prosecutors-intl-criminal-court/.
54 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2017, at 294 (2018),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/crt_2017.pdf (providing a description of the
organization and terrorist activities of the Haqqani Network, which was designated as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization by the Department of State on September 19, 2012).
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entirety, meaning that the OTP lacks judicial authorization to investigate any of the
three categories of crimes listed in Prosecutor Bensouda’s request, including those
committed by the Taliban. This is especially concerning, not only because of the
gravity of the Taliban’s atrocity crimes, but also because—unlike the alleged crimes
committed by Afghan forces and the U.S. military—the OTP had obtained
meaningful cooperation from both international and domestic organizations in
Afghanistan and had compiled significant evidence connecting the Taliban to these
alleged crimes.5 5 The Trump administration’s rash and selfish attack on the ICC
has effectively prevented one of the world’s most feared and despised terrorist
organizations from facing repercussion for some of its most heinous crimes.
More broadly, the Trump administration’s hostilities against the ICC
undermine U.S. foreign policy initiatives advocating for the international
prosecution of atrocities perpetrated abroad. For instance, the Trump administration
has maintained a policy of bringing to justice those responsible for the persecution
of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar,5 6 which the U.N. has labeled a “textbook
example of ethnic cleansing.”5 7 While the Trump administration has noted “serious
concerns” regarding the capability of Myanmar’s domestic judicial system to
adequately prosecute those crimes, it has also failed to provide a valid option for a
judicial mechanism that would be capable of rendering appropriate justice. 5 8 The
United States’s refusal to acknowledge the potential of the ICC, which has
recognized jurisdiction over certain aspects of the Rohingya situation and currently
appears to be the only criminal law mechanism capable of achieving justice for the
Rohingya,5 9 not only portrays the current administration as illogical and
uncooperative, but more importantly disadvantages the victims of these crimes. If
the current administration is—as it claims—striving to achieve justice for the
Rohingya and similarly situated victims of internationally recognized crimes, its
failure to cooperate and support the ICC essentially renders this goal unattainable.

55 See Kevin Jon Heller, One Word for the PTC on the Interests of Justice: Taliban, OPINIO
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2018),
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crime occurred in the ICC State Party of Bangladesh, fell within the jurisdiction of the Rome
Statute. See generally Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICCRoC46(3)-01/18, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction Under Article
19(3) of the Statute (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_04203.PDF.
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Finally, the Trump administration’s attack on the ICC and the subsequent PTC
decision is most detrimental to the victims of the heinous crimes committed in
Afghanistan. A 2017 report issued by the Office of the Prosecutor on the
investigation into Afghanistan included tentative estimations that the Taliban and its
affiliated groups were responsible for 17,000 civilian deaths, 7000 of which were
the result of deliberate and targeted civilian attacks, including attacks on schools,
shrines, mosques, and humanitarian organizations’ offices.6 0 The ICC’s decision to
close the investigation at the bullying hands of the Trump administration rewards
the perpetrators of these crimes with temporary, and possibly complete, impunity.
Again, not only does this impunity contribute to issues of instability within the
Afghani government and society, but it further undermines U.S. policy to bring to
justice those Taliban leaders responsible for these mass atrocities, many of whom
also targeted U.S. military personnel.
CONCLUSION
In June 2019, Prosecutor Bensouda filed a request seeking clearance to appeal
the PTC’s decision denying the investigation.6 1 Likewise, legal representatives for
eighty-two victims of all three categories of crimes listed in the investigation request
have lodged their appeal of the PTC decision with the ICC Appeals Chamber with
oral arguments conducted in December 2019.6 2 In addition, several former U.N.
Special Rapporteurs, international experts, and international organizations,
including Amnesty International and Human Right Watch, among others, have filed
requests to submit amicus curiae observations with the ICC, arguing that the PreTrial Chamber erred in finding that opening the investigation into Afghanistan
would not serve the interests of justice.6 3
It is also important to note that the PTC decision does not completely close the
preliminary examination into the situation in Afghanistan. Indeed, Article 15
provides that a denial of authorization “shall not preclude the presentation of a
subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the
same situation.”6 4 Yet, even considering the acquisition of new evidence supporting
the commission of grave crimes in Afghanistan, given the PTC’s “interests of
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justice” reasoning, it is difficult to see how any proposed investigation could obtain
the necessary authorization to move forward.
The full extent of the effects of the current U.S. administration’s approach to
the ICC, especially with regard to its investigation into Afghanistan, remain yet to
be seen. However, its efforts to paint the ICC as an illegitimate, ineffective
institution may serve to compromise U.S. national security efforts and foreign policy
initiatives. As far as the ICC, substantial speculation remains whether the court will
recover swiftly from the backlash of the PTC decision, or whether, as John Bolton
has predicted, it will “die on its own.”6 5
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